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BELIEF, FOREKNOWLEDGE, AND 
THEOLOGICAL FATALISM 
Charles T. Hughes 
David Hunt has recently developed a new strategy, called the "dispositional 
omniscience scenario," or (OOS), which is designed to defeat theological fatal-
ism by showing the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human (liber-
tarian) free agency. But I argue that Hunt fails to establish his compatibility 
claim because (DOS) is based on a defective analysis of dispositional belief 
that is too weak to sustain any divine foreknowledge of future free actions. 
I 
Theological fatalism is the position that the existence of a divine being 
who is eternally and essentially omniscient is incompatible with human 
(libertarian) free agency. The incompatibility claim arises because such a 
divine being would possess immutable and infallible knowledge about 
all human future free actions prior to the realization of those actions. 
And such divine knowledge is thought to be incompatible with human 
free agency because it deprives humans of the power to act otherwise, 
which is the chief element of libertarian freedom. 
Theists have responded to the problem raised by theological fatalism 
with several different strategies. Those theists who accept the incompati-
bility claim have resolved the problem by denying either (libertarian) 
free agenci or else divine foreknowledge of future free actions.2 Theists 
who reject the incompatibility claim have developed various strategies 
to show that divine foreknowledge and human (libertarian) free agency 
are compatible with one another. 
Some compatibility strategies depend upon a particular understand-
ing of the hard facts (which are immutably "fixed" in the past) and the 
soft facts (which are not immutably "fixed" until some later time) about 
free actions which make up divine forebeliefs. Thus, the "Ockhamist" 
strategy claims that divine forebeliefs about future free actions are not 
hard facts before the free actions take place, otherwise those facts would 
be freedom annihilating. Instead, such divine forebeliefs become hard 
facts only after the free actions in question have taken place, thus pre-
serving free agency.3 Another compatibility strategy denies that God has 
any beliefs at all that mediate reality to him, because divine knowledge 
implies unmediated awareness of reality. That strategy escapes the 
incompatibility problem insofar as the problem is generated by the sup-
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posed existence of divine forebeliefs. 4 
But both previously mentioned compatibility strategies have been 
charged with committing the fallacy of special pleading when it comes 
to divine cognitions. And if that charge is true, then those strategies are 
flawed and so may not resolve the problem of theological fatalism. 
However, David Hunt has developed a new compatibility strategy, 
called the dispositional omniscience scenario or (DOS), which cannot be 
charged with special pleading concerning divine cognitions.' Hunt con-
tends that God has beliefs and that divine cognitions are relevantly simi-
lar to human cognitions. One consequence of the similarity is that the 
charge of theological fatalism fails because its success is shown to 
depend upon an equivocation between divine occurrent and dispositional 
beliefs. So, if (DOS) works, it offers theists a compatibility strategy that 
does not depend on any "special pleading" about divine cognitions in 
order to succeed. 
My purpose in this essay is to argue that Hunt's (DOS) is based on a 
defective analysis of dispositional belief that prevents it from resolving the 
incompatibility problem raised by theological fatalism. More specifically, I 
will argue that Hunt's claim, that dispositional beliefs need not be "locat-
ed" in the mind of the believer, is unpersuasive. If I am right, then Hunt's 
view of dispositional belief is too weak to sustain any divine forebeliefs 
about future free actions and so cannot reconcile divine forebeliefs and 
human (libertarian) free agency. But what is Hunt's compatibility strategy? 
II 
In order to understand how (DOS) allegedly shows the compatibility 
of divine forebeliefs and human (libertarian) free agency, I must first 
review Hunt's definitions of occurrent and dispositional beliefs, and 
hard and soft facts. After that, J will review Hunt's analysis of disposi-
tional belief and then summarize the main elements of (DOS). 
(1) Occurrent belief. Agent x has the occurrent belief p at t if agent x 
consciously affirms pat t. 
(2) Dispositional belief. "[F]or x to have at t the nonoccurrent or dispo-
sitional belief that p is for x to be such that, were certain condi-
tions to obtain at t (e.g., the conditions involved in x's consider-
ing whether p), x would at t have the occurrent belief that p."6 
Hunt does not try to develop precise definitions of hard and soft facts 
because he does not think such definitions are required for his argument 
to work. 
(3) Hard facts. Hard [propositional] facts are immutably "fixed" prior 
to the realization of the actions or events they describe. 
(4) Soft facts. Soft [propositional] facts are immutably "fixed" at the 
time the actions or events they describe are realized. 
Hunt's analysis of dispositional belief includes three conditions that 
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play important roles in identifying an agent's occurrent and disposition-
al beliefs at some time. They are: 
(5) The Access Condition. Were circumstance C to obtain, x would 
occurrently believe at t that p.? 
(6) The Secure Access Condition. This is a special case of the Access 
Condition, where "having access to p" and "being in command of 
p-having access to p at will, free (within limits) from frustration 
or delay," entails belief.' 
(7) The Location Condition. The mechanism by which the obtaining of 
C would lead to x's occurrently believing that p involves x's 
accessing at t a representation whose content is p and whose 
location at t is [metaphysically] internal to [the mind of] x." 
Hunt claims that a proposition need not satisfy the Location 
Condition to qualify as a dispositional belief. For, he claims, "there 
appear to be clear cases of knowledge that fail to satisfy [the Location] 
condition."10 To establish that claim, Hunt first analyzes three scenarios 
to determine how the proposition, "Today is Monday," could become 
the occurrent belief of an agent if he were to consider what day it is. The 
scenarios Hunt considers are as follows: 
(a) The closest nonactual world in which I consider what day it is, is a 
world in which I remember that it is Monday. 
(b) The closest nonactual world in which I consider what day it is, is a 
world in which I find out that it is Monday (e.g., by checking 
today's newspaper). 
(c) The closest nonactual world in which I consider what day it is, is a 
world in which I figure out [by inference] that it is Monday.!! 
Hunt allows that the Location Condition correctly identifies (a) as a 
case of intra-mental dispositional belief, which rises to the level of occur-
rent (conscious) belief when retrieved from an agent's memory. But he 
claims that what is sufficient to qualify both (a) and (c) as dispositional 
beliefs is the agent's Secure Access in both cases to the proposition 
"Today is Monday," rather than its location in the agent's mind. So, 
according to Hunt, (c) is a case of extra-mental dispositional belief. He 
then classifies (b) as a scenario of nonbelief. Why? Not because (b) vio-
lates the Location Condition, as it clearly does, but rather because the 
agent has no Secure Access to the proposition in (b) and so may not be 
able to discover it. 
Thus, Hunt rejects the necessity of the Location Condition because it 
excludes allegedly legitimate cases of extra-mental dispositional belief, 
like case (c). He claims that (c) is a scenario of extra-mental dispositional 
belief because the agent has Secure (Inferential) Access to the proposition 
in (c) and so (with only limited delay) can make it an occurrent belief at 
will. So, if Hunt's analysis of (a)-(c) is correct, then the Secure Access 
Condition alone is sufficient for determining an agent's intra-mental and 
extra-mental dispositional beliefs. 
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The good news here for Hunt's (DOS) is that an eternally and essen-
tially omniscient divine being has maximally Secure Access to the content 
and truth-values of all propositions, including future free contingents. 
Therefore, on Hunt's view, all true future free contingent propositions 
count as the content of divine extra-mental dispositional beliefs. And, as 
extra-mental dispositional beliefs, they qualify as soft facts about the past 
rather than as Izard facts about it. But how is human (libertarian) free 
agency protected if God has extra-mental dispositional forebeliefs about 
future free actions? 
Free agency is protected by (DOS) because the problem of theological 
fatalism depends crucially upon divine forebeliefs about future free con-
tingent propositions being located in the mind of God. Thus, only divine 
intra-mental forebeliefs are freedom annihilating hard facts. Why? 
Because their contents and truth-values would have been immutably 
"fixed" in the divine mind prior to the future actions they depict, thus 
denying human agents the power to act otherwise. 
So, Hunt's (DOS) allegedly protects free agency because God's disposi-
tional forebeliefs about future free contingent propositions are not locat-
ed in the divine mind. Instead, as divine extra-mental dispositional 
beliefs, they are soft facts about future free actions. And, as soft facts, 
they are not immutably "fixed" as beliefs in God's mind prior to the real-
ization of the actions described in the future free contingent proposi-
tions. Therefore, according to Hunt, if God possesses only extra-mental 
dispositional beliefs about future free contingents, then the problem of 
theological fatalism is generated only by equivocating between divine 
occurrent and divine extra-mental dispositional beliefs. 
(DOS), then, may be summarized as follows: 
(A) God has maximally Secure Access to all true propositions, even if 
he has never before considered them. These include future free 
contingent propositions. Thus, if God wished to form true 
occurrent beliefs about future free contingent propositions, he 
could do so. 
(B) But God has never formed occurrent beliefs about the relevant 
future free contingent propositions. If he had, those divine 
beliefs would be hard facts about the past, prior to the realization 
of the actions described in those propositions, and so freedom 
annihilating. 
(C) Therefore, since God could but never has accessed the content 
and truth-values of future free contingent propositions, beliefs 
in those propositions qualify only as divine extra-mental dispo-
sitional beliefs. As extra-mental dispositional beliefs they are soft 
facts, which means that their truth-values are not "fixed" as 
beliefs in God's mind until the actions described in the proposi-
tions actually take place. Thus, God's extra-mental dispositional 
forebeliefs about future free contingent propositions are compat-
ible with human (libertarian) free agency. 
But does (DOS) successfully rebut theological fatalism? I do not think so. 
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III 
The chief problem for Hunt's (DOS) is that it is based on a defective 
analysis of dispositional belief. To make my case against (DOS), I argue 
in this section that it is plausible to think that the Location Condition is a 
necessary condition for belief and, in the next, that Hunt's case to the 
contrary is unpersuasive. But why should we think it plausible that the 
Location Condition is a necessary condition for belief? 
One reason that the Location Condition is often accepted as a neces-
sary condition for belief is its intuitive appeal. But what support is there 
for that intuition? The answer becomes clear when the cognitive dimen-
sion of the Location Condition is identified. A minimal statement of the 
cognitive elements the Location Condition requires for an agent to 
believe that p, either occurrently or dispositionally, is as follows: 
(i) the agent understands/understood the propositional content of p, and 
(ii) the agent assents/assented to p (explicitly or implicitly) because he 
thinks (or thought) that p is true, or is probably true, or may be 
true (even if p is false). 
So, what the cognitive dimension of the Location Condition makes 
clear is that an agent's belief-relevant functions can take place only in his 
mind. But the Location Condition also seems to imply an order of belief-
acquisition that it is important to sketch in order to facilitate discussion 
in this section and the next. The implied order of belief-acquisition 
seems to be as follows: First come occurrent beliefs, understood and 
assented to (explicitly or implicitly) by agents via a rich network of 
belief-acquisitional channels. In the case of humans, occurrent beliefs are 
acquired and then fade from consciousness to the status of dispositional 
beliefs within memory, though some beliefs may be forgotten (i.e., not 
recorded, or recorded but erased, or else recorded but unretrievable), or 
nearly forgotten, (i.e., recorded but retrievable only in special circum-
stances). And, those dispositional beliefs that are accessible within mem-
ory, may again rise to the level of occurrent belief when retrieved from 
memory. 
But even this brief and provisional characterization of belief-acquisi-
tion/ statuses invites an apparent counter-example that, if true, under-
mines the necessity of the Location Condition for dispositional belief. The 
counter-example begins when we ask agent x at t1 if she believes that 
(PI) The world wasn't created five minutes ago, 
and she claims that she has always believed (Pl)." And let us suppose 
that (PI) has never occurred to agent x before t1. Would it then follow 
that (PI) nevertheless qualifies as a long-standing extra-mental disposi-
tional belief of agent x's? If it does, then the Location Condition is not a 
necessary condition for dispositional belief because, in this case, (i) and 
(ii) have been bypassed. But does the counter-example work? To answer 
that question, let us examine the counter-example carefully. 
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Clearly, agent x would understand (PI) if she considered it. Does it fol-
low, then, that agent x does understand (PI) if she has never before tI 
considered or assented to it? No. What follows is that agent x has a 
strong disposition to believe (PI), and so would understand and assent to 
(PI) if she were to consider it. So, it does not follow that she already 
understands and assents to the propositional content of (PI) before tI, 
for she never considered (PI) before t1. Thus, it also follows that (PI) is 
not a longstanding (extra-mental) dispositional belief of agent x's. 
But that may seem to be a prima facie odd conclusion. For, surely, one 
might claim, agent x has always believed (PI) regardless of whether she 
has considered and assented to it before tI. However, as we will see, the 
apparent counter-example does not work despite its prima facie plausibil-
ity. In order to identify where it goes wrong, several points about the 
status and genealogy of beliefs must be clarified and briefly considered. 
What is clear in this case is that (PI) is a necessary presupposition of, 
and / or an immediate and necessary inference from, agent x's beliefs 
about what happened more than five minutes ago. But does the fact that 
(PI) is a necessary presupposition of many of, or an immediate inference 
from, agent x's beliefs mean that (PI) is one of agent x's dispositional 
beliefs? No. For, there are no doubt many propositions agent x has never 
thought of or assented to which are necessary presuppositions of, or 
immediate inferences from, her explicitly held beliefs. But it does not fol-
low that such propositions are, for that reason, to be counted as her 
beliefs. To see why, consider (PI) again. (PI) is a proposition agent x will 
understand and affirm immediately when she considers it. It is also very 
likely that she will claim that she has "always believed" (P1). And she 
may make that claim even if she has never before thought of (PI) or 
assented to it. But does that mean that agent x is right, or that we are 
therefore warranted in positing (PI) as one of agent x's dispositional 
beliefs? No. In what follows, I try to show that there is a more plausible 
alternative understanding of the status of agent x's belief that (PI). 
To begin with, it is reasonable to assume that agent x acquired as one 
of her early beliefs, (first occurrent and then intra-mental dispositional), 
that 
(P2) The earth is old, 
or some near relation to that proposition. So, if agent x ever considered 
the temporal implications of (P2), she might have thought of (PI) or 
some proposition with an equivalent meaning to (PI), assented to it, and 
then forgotten it. In that case, she would have briefly believed (PI) 
occurrently and then (PI) would have been forgotten, or nearly forgot-
ten, by agent x. 
So, agent x might affirm (PI) at tI, convinced that it is a proposition 
she has always believed, even if she has never considered or assented to 
it before t1. Thus, agent x may be acquiring (PI) as a new belief at the 
moment she understands and assents to it. And her subsequent claim to 
have believed (PI) all of her life may be a mistake on her part. But it 
would be an easy mistake to make, if (PI) is a necessary presupposition 
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of, and/or an immediate and necessary inference from, other beliefs 
agent x does hold. In that case, the strength of agent x's disposition to 
believe (PI), which is a function of (PI)'s relation to her other beliefs, 
makes it easy for her to mistake a new belief for an old belief. 
But what if (PI) is now an unconscious belief of agent x? Does that sug-
gestion shed any light on the question of the necessity of the Location 
Condition in matters of belief? No. For the current unconscious status of 
a belief does not entail that it was originally acquired apart from the 
constraints of the Location Condition. So, it may well be that uncon-
scious beliefs are beliefs about propositions we have understood and 
assented to in the past, but have since nearly forgotten. 
Of course, if an agent could provide a dependable genealogy of his 
belief-acquisitions, which excludes the requirements of the Location 
Condition, then the Location Condition's necessity for belief would be 
undermined. But so much about the true genealogy of belief-acquisition 
has been lost to agents that, in controversial cases, they cannot deter-
mine which of their beliefs are new beliefs and which are older (disposi-
tional) beliefs. That is so because the set of an agent's explicit beliefs pro-
vides him with strong dispositions to believe numerous propositions 
that he has never before considered or assented to. Therefore, given the 
serious limitations one faces here, it seems rash to identify an agent's 
actual beliefs apart from the sensible requirements laid down by the 
Location Condition. 
That concludes my brief case for the position that it is plausible to 
think that the Location Condition is a necessary condition for disposi-
tional belief. But can Hunt's arguments, nevertheless, provide plausible 
support for his claim that some dispositional beliefs are not located in 
the mind of the believer? 
IV 
In section II above, I reported Hunt's claim that the following scenario 
describes an instance of extra-mental dispositional belief: 
(c) The closest nonactual world in which I consider what day it is, is 
a world in which I find out [by inference] that it is Monday.13 
Part of Hunt's justification for the claim that (c) is a scenario of extra-
mental dispositional belief is made clear when he says: "Here there is 
preoccurrent knowledge that today is Monday without this propositional 
content being represented in a memory trace or other mental state that 
satisfies the Location Condition." 14 
What should be noticed about Hunt's claim, however, is that preoccur-
rent knowledge could be either a dispositional belief that p or else a disposi-
tion to believe that p. But the Location Condition's requirements make it 
intelligible why (c) identifies only an agent's disposition to believe a 
proposition that he later infers from other beliefs he does have. Why? 
Because in the case of (c), the agent who "figures out" that p, "Today is 
Monday," rather than retrieving p from memory, is one who has acquired 
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a new belief through an inferential process. For, if an agent has already 
believed that p, then the agent will not have to "figure out" by inference 
that p.IS The proposition "Today is Monday" is not a proposition to 
which any explicit or implicit assent was given by the agent in (c) prior 
to thinking about the question "Which day is it today?" Thus it does not 
count as the agent's belief (dispositional or otherwise) prior to his infer-
ring or intuiting that "Today is Monday." 
Further problems plague a notion of belief that excludes the Location 
Condition as a necessary condition for dispositional belief. Suppose, for 
example, that no one has yet discovered the fact that my wife murdered 
her first husband. Suppose further that I know all of the relevant facts 
about the event such that, if I were to consider the matter seriously, I 
would (with only limited delay) make an inference to the truth of the 
matter. In other words, if I have Secure (Inferential) Access to the true 
proposition that 
(P3) My wife murdered her first husband, 
does it follow that (P3) is an extra-mental dispositional belief of mine? 
No. It makes no sense to claim that (P3) qualifies as my dispositional 
belief simply because I have Secure (Inferential) Access to the truth of (P3). 
For, if I never assent to the truth of (P3), it cannot count as my belief. 
What does make sense is that I have a disposition to believe (P3). So, to 
admit that I have Secure (Inferential) Access to p does not confer upon p 
the status of a dispositional belief of mine. Such Access identifies only 
my disposition to believe that p. 
But what if I am self-deceived about (P3)? Would that shed any light 
on this matter? No. For, if I am self-deceived about the truth of (P3), then 
I have already assented to its truth but then repressed my newly acquired 
belief in some way. Or, instead, I may have managed somehow to with-
hold my assent to (and so my belief in) (P3), despite the strength of my 
disposition to believe it. Thus, even if I have engaged in self-deception 
about the truth value of (P3), I have done so in conformity to the require-
ments set forth by the Location Condition. 
There is another unwelcome consequence that comes with Hunt's 
claim that (c) identifies an instance of extra-mental dispositional belief, 
rather than a disposition to believe. For if we include as extra-mental 
dispositional beliefs all those propositions to which we have Secure 
(Inferential) Access, then where do such dispositional beliefs end? Do 
they end at propositions that are immediate inferences only? No, they 
do not. In fact, such a restriction seems arbitrary. But if we can be said to 
believe propositions that could be securely inferred from our other 
beliefs (if we made the effort), then these can include propositions that 
could be inferred by complicated and drawn-out chains of reasoning. 
And, since more and more beliefs could be inferred from these new 
beliefs, the consequent chain of "beliefs" would grow exponentially. We 
might thus find that our supposed finite set of beliefs turns out to be infi-
nite at the dispositional level. 
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v 
If the Location Condition is accepted as a necessary condition for dis-
positional belief, the consequences for (DOS) are grim. For, Hunt's 
notion of extra-mental dispositional belief violates it and so does not 
identify dispositional beliefs for humans or for God. l6 Instead, Hunt's 
description of divine extra-mental dispositional belief identifies only a 
divine disposition to believe that p, where p is some future free contingent 
proposition. This means that Hunt's view of extra-mental dispositional 
belief is too weak to sustain any divine dispositional fore beliefs about 
future free contingent propositions. 
Of course, the objection could be raised that my previous analysis of 
Hunt's view applies only to the Secure Access Condition with respect to 
human beliefs (which are fallible) but not to divine beliefs (which are 
infallible). After all, God has maximally Secure Access to all propositions, 
including future free contingents. So, is it not the case that even those 
propositions not considered by God count as divine extra-mental dispo-
sitional beliefs? No. 
The Location Condition makes it clear that it is not sufficient for God 
to have maximally Secure Access to all future free contingent propositions 
in order for them to count as his dispositional beliefs. For, unless God 
has understood and assented to the propositional content and truth-values 
of the future free contingent propositions prior to their realization, he 
cannot be said to possess them as forebeliefs. Instead, they would have 
only the status of propositions God has a disposition to believe. Therefore, 
because (DOS) withholds the content and truth-values of future free 
contingent propositions from the divine mind, God cannot be said to 
possess any forebeliefs about future free contingents. 
I have argued that (DOS) is based on a deficient analysis of disposi-
tional belief that prevents it from resolving the problem raised by theo-
logical fatalism. Thus, when (DOS) dispenses with the Location 
Condition as a necessary condition for belief, it ends up denying God 
any forebeliefs about future free contingent propositions. And, while the 
incompatibility strategy that denies God such forebeliefs does avoid theo-
logical fatalism, (DOS) is meant to show the compatibility of divine fore-
beliefs and human (libertarian) free agency. Therefore, (DOS) fails." 
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